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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the traditional approach to software development within the United Kingdom 
Government and the accreditation process. Initially we look at the Waterfall methodology that has been 
used for several years. We discuss the pros and cons of Waterfall before moving onto the Agile Scrum 
methodology. Agile has been adopted by the majority of Government digital departments including the 
Government Digital Services. Agile, despite its ability to achieve high rates of productivity organized in 
short, flexible, iterations, has faced security professionals’ disbelief when working within the U.K. 
Government. One of the major issues is that we develop in Agile but the accreditation process is conducted 
using Waterfall resulting in delays to go live dates. Taking a brief look into the accreditation process that is 
used within Government for I.T. systems and applications, we focus on giving the accreditor the assurance 
they need when developing new applications and systems. A framework has been produced by utilising the 
Open Web Application Security Project’s (OWASP) Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS). 
This framework will allow security and Agile to work side by side and produce secure code. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper will be based around three concepts; firstly a literature review based on current 
software development methodologies, like Waterfall and Agile, as well as a brief review of the 
accreditation process and the Government Service Design Manual. Secondly a gap analysis on the 
findings from the literature review, and, thirdly recommendations for addressing these gaps. We 
finally present a framework in the shape of an excel spreadsheet, which is based on the Open 
Web Application Security Project’s (OWASP) Application Security Verification Standard 
(ASVS).  
 
In the United Kingdom (U.K.) Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) are making more public 
services available on-line for its citizens.[1] An example of this is purchasing vehicle tax online 
now, instead of over the counter, in a Post Office. A number of departments and offices are 
currently undergoing huge changes in making these services available, for example the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) are changing the way we access parts of the benefits 
system by allowing claimants to make benefit claims on-line using the Universal Credit (UC) 
system. The security within these on-line systems is of utmost importance to prevent fraud and 
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error.[2][3]Security is equally important for the front-end Internet services, as well as the back-
end processing systems. Therefore, security by design during the initial requirements phase is a 
must. 
 
Agile is a software development methodology that has been used in the commercial world for 
some time, and it comes in different methods, such as Scrum, eXtreme Programming (XP), 
Crystal and Adaptive Software Development (ASD). I.T. and digital departments within HMG, 
despite their initial objections, are nowadays following the Agile approach to software/application 
development. Security and Agile are not a good mix, though, and security can be seen as a 
blocker in some cases. The formal HMG security accreditation process does not fit well with 
Agile as this predominately follows a Waterfall process.[4] Agile is replacing the traditional 
‘Waterfall’ methodology for software and digital project development. What is needed is a way 
of embedding security into the Agile process without slowing down the rapid development nature 
of Agile. At the same time, we need to give the accreditor and the senior business owner the 
assurance they need to formally sign off the system for live use.  
 
The focus of this work will be on developing a security framework that can be used within Agile 
sprints to develop secure applications and to give assurance to both the accreditor/senior business 
owner that any technical risks have been mitigated. 
 
2. THE WATERFALL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
 
Our first aim was to conduct a mapping of the pros and cons of the methodologies at hand. First 
of all we researched the Waterfall development method. Then we proceed with the Agile and the 
Scrum methodology investigation, followed by an analysis on the current HMG accreditation 
process and the Government Service Design Manual. Finally we investigate the use of testing 
frameworks within Agile sprints in particular OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 
(ASVS). 
 
Traditionally, software and system development within Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) 
Departments and Offices has followed a Waterfall methodology for development of anything 
from small to large I.T. projects that have an impact on whole organisations for example the 
National Health Service (NHS). The Waterfall methodology involves a series of cascading steps 
that cover the development process with a small level of iteration between each stage. The major 
problem with using the Waterfall methodology for the development of Web applications (and 
also Information Systems) is the rigidity of its structure and lack of iteration between any stage, 
other than adjacent stages. We should look in detail at each stage of the waterfall methodology 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Waterfall methodology
Waterfall methodology is organized into the next sub
 
A) Requirements phase: Its m
and user needs that the system is being designed to solve. For example, take the NHS. A 
business requirement could be to “analyse illness trends in relation to seasons”. A team of 
business analysts, business users, managers and I.T. experts will be created to ensure all 
the requirements are gathered correctly. The requirements phase, typically, consumes 
approximately 30% of the overall development cycle. The requirements are usually “set 
in stone” with little room for change once the decision has been made. Once the main 
requirement have been gathered then subset requirements will be generated for example 
the I.T. requirements could be split into security, service level agreements (SLA) or 
software development. [5]
 
B) Design Phase: With all the requirements gathered the design of the actual system starts 
to take place. Within a software project the design phase is split into two sections
first is the system design
It also includes how each component will interact with each other by means of a data 
flow diagram.The second is the
component will operate separately. Software engineers are assigned to components to 
plan how they will interact with each other. This has to be documented as this will form 
the input for the next phase. The design phase will use approximately 35% of the overall 
development cycle.[6] 
 
C) Implementation Phase
The information from the first two phases is gathered and converted into working 
software by means of the components.
 
D) Verification Phase: This phase is where the testing takes place
is User Acceptance Testing (UAT). This is to ensure that the system actually does what 
the requirements and the design phases stipulated. Within HMG this is the phase that 
Penetration Testing or an I.T. Health Check (I.T.H.C.) would be carried out. The testing 
would be looking for vulnerabilities within the system infrastructure and applications 
 Model. 
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running the system. If major issues are found then this could result in components being 
re-written in software, this can have the knock on affect that if one component is changed 
it can affect the operation of other components. The implementation and verification 
phase will use approximately 30% of the overall development cycle. 
 
E) Maintenance Phase:This phase of the project is normally where the system is signed off 
for use by an accreditor and operationally accepted by the business. This is to ensure 
everything is running within parameters and that changes or patches to the system are 
applied using change control methods. The maintenance phase is also preparing 
everything for “go-live”, for example the training of staff, ensuring documentation is 
complete and handing over the system to the operational staff. The Ops staff will be 
responsible for the daily running of the system. The maintenance phase will use 
approximately 5% of the overall development cycle. 
 
As we can see the output of each stage is the input for the following stage. However, the 
Waterfall method does not fit into modern software development needs were business 
requirements are often rapidly changing. Waterfall is often referred to a “Big Design Upfront” 
(BDUF) approach, this is where the application design is to be completed and perfected before 
the application implementation is started. Hence the need for a more flexible approach to 
software development and Agile [7]. 
 
The Internet is a rapidly advancing environment with new technologies becoming available 
almost daily. Any methodology used for the development of Web sites must be flexible enough to 
cope with change.[8]. This does not only apply to web sites but can also apply to I.T. projects in 
general.In 1970 Winston W. Royce delivered a paper to the IEEE WestCom engineering 
conference, this paper described what is now considered traditional waterfall. The paper 
described a sequential process where each phase is completed before the next begins. Royce 
offered this model as an example of how not to do software development. However, the audience 
liked this development model and in 1985 the American Department of Defence (DoD) adopted it 
as the official methodology for developing projects. [9] 
 
2.1. Waterfall Issues 
 
Waterfall follows a sequential process completing each phase before moving onto the next. Each 
phase is fully documented before moving on, this documentation can take a long time to achieve 
resulting in projects being delayed.  The production of vast amounts of documentation during the 
initial requirements phase can lead to the omissions (due to the process being tedious) of some 
requirements which can have a serious knock on effect during the other phases of the process. 
During Waterfall development the requirements both business and system are “set in stone”. 
Indeed, the backbone to Waterfall is in the requirement phase. This freezing of the requirements 
is great for software developers as everybody knows upfront what is expected. However, 
technologies are changing on a daily basis. Moreover, business or customers may not know the 
exact requirements they have. So, software development has to be dynamic and adapt to these 
changes and system requirements. Waterfall does not accommodate these changes readily.  
 
By the time the system reaches operational ‘go live’ and is about to be handed over to the 
operations team, the systems are in desperate need for software and patching updates. This again 
can add to the delay for the project to go live due to operations rejecting a system that is needing 
patching. There is normally a discussion or quite often a standoff between operations and project 
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staff about the handover, with the operations staff having to take on the operational running of the 
system due to pressure from the business. Normally at the end of a Waterfall project there is a 
“lessons learnt” meeting, which can, and often, lasts for hours. It is very much focused on 
team/technology/project specific issues that have occurred during the project. In the authors 
experience the majority of people who attend a “lessons learnt” meeting that lasts for several 
hours are reluctant to mention issues they encountered for the sheer fact they want to get out of 
the meeting and move onto the next project.When Government has used Waterfall in the past this 
has often resulted in huge overspend, delays in getting the system operational and less 
functionality than originally expected. 
 
2.2. Agile Scrum 
 
Scrum is a simple framework used to organize teams and get work done more productively, with 
higher quality. It is a “lean” approach to software development that allows teams to choose the 
amount of work to be done and decide how to do it best. Designed to adapt to changing 
requirements during the development process at short, regular intervals, it prioritizes customer 
requirements to evolve the work product in real time to customer needs. In this way, Scrum 
provides what the customer wants at the time of delivery (improving customer satisfaction) while 
eliminating waste (work that is not highly valued by the customer) [10]. Although Sutherland 
gives a very good description of Scrum there is no mention of security considerations when 
developing software. 
 
Agile follows a thought process of Fail Fast, Fail Often in order to improve the software and the 
teams developing the software. Many agile puritans read these agile values and interpret them 
incorrectly, the use of the word “over” is misconstrued to mean “instead of” an example this 
would be the second agile value “Working software over comprehensive documentation”, or, 
“Working software” is more valuable than “comprehensive documentation” when thinking about 
delivery to the customer in principle number one. 
 
2.2.1.Scrum 
 
It has been said that Agile Scrum is compared to a rugby team scrum in where the team move and 
work as one. When this is compared to the relatively linear approach of Waterfall it is easy to see 
how Agile Scrum became known as Scrum[10][11].  
 
The artefacts listed below are what enable the Scrum process to deliver products: 
 
A) Product Backlog: A list of deliverables for the project, like: features, functionality or 
bug fixes.  
 
B) Sprint Backlog: A list of tasks or user stories that have been identified by the Scrum 
team that will be completed by the sprint team.  
 
 
C) Burn Charts: There are two type of burn charts “burn up” and “burn down”. Burn charts 
show the team the relationship between time and scope. Time is on the horizontal X-axis 
while scope is on the Y-axis. A burn up chart shows how much of the scope the team has 
completed over a period of time. A burn down chart show what work is left to do.The 
two charts are used independently. 
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D) Task Board:The task board in its simplest form consists of three columns these are:To 
Do, Doing, and Done.  
 
E) User Stories:Agile user stories are a main element in the methodology, they are short 
descriptions from the viewpoint of the user. They normally consist of the following short 
sentences, like: “As a <type of user>, I want <some goal> so that <some reason>” 
 
2.2.2. Roles within Scrum 
 
Scrum recognises three primary roles: 
 
A) Product Owner: Usually a member of the business who understands what is trying to be 
achieved by completing the project, they often have direct contact with the customers 
who will use the software/system.  
B) Scrum Master: Brings leadership to the team, but this not is leadership though influence 
of being a higher rank within the organisation but rather has a helpful friend or “agony 
aunt”.  
C) Team Member: The scrum team usually consists of approximately 7 members, plus or 
minus two. The members have a variety of skills depending on the project they are taking 
part in.  
 
2.3. Sprints 
 
Sprints are one of the fundamental concepts of Agile, this is the process of splitting or dividing 
your overall project into smaller pieces. An example of this can be an application that has various 
functions take Microsoft Word for instance. The overall project would be to design a word 
processing application however functions like save, print and labels would be split into smaller 
pieces of work or sprints. These functions when combined with other functions are what make up 
the application. The same would happen in an Agile project. 
 
2.3.1. Sprint Planning 
 
Sprint planning occurs at the beginning of the sprint; the meeting is normally split into two parts. 
The first part of the meeting deals with the deliverables for the sprint so that the team are 
committed to producing what is needed. At the second part of the meeting the team deals with the 
identification of the tasks that are needed to complete the stories. The user story could be “as a 
user I want to be able to print from the application”. The tasks associated with the user story 
could be: design the icon and design the print screen wireframe once the icon is pressed. 
 
2.3.2. Sprint Review 
 
At the end of the sprint a review takes place this review goes under the guises of “show and tell” 
or “sprint demo” in essence it is the same thing. It is a chance for the team members to show off 
their work to the stakeholders and also report on which work did not get completed. 
 
2.3.3. Retrospective 
 
This is a review meeting also held at the end of each sprint, it is a kind of lessons learn exercise 
that all sprints normally hold. The difference in Agile is the lessons learnt will be applied to the 
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next sprint whereas with a Waterfall project the lessons learnt is at the end of the project with the 
intention of applying these lessons to the next big project. In reality this seldom happens and 
everybody is just happy to get out of the meeting to start another project. 
 
2.4. Daily scrum 
 
The daily scrum or stand-up meeting is as the name suggests daily meetings for team members, 
scrum master and product owners[12]. These are often referred to as “committed” members. 
Other members are “involved” members these could be sales directors, Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO) or Chief Information Security Officers (CISO). The meeting are normally held in the same 
place at the same time, each team member will be asked to inform the meeting members of the 
following: 
 
A) What I accomplished since the last scrum meeting. 
B) What I expect to accomplish by the next scrum meeting. 
C) What obstacles are slowing me down. 
 
Should there be any slippage or delays then the product owner will know immediately and may 
be able to take corrective action. In theory the product owner should be aware of all outstanding 
issues no more than a day old.  
 
As we can see Agile is clearly about producing good code in a timely manner of which it does 
without doubt. One issue that is on most security consultants and accreditors minds is “where is 
the security in all of this rapid development and how do I get it accredited”. 
 
 
2.5. Issues with Agile Scrum 
 
When comparing Agile scrum to the Waterfall methodology there are obvious advantages in 
favour of Agile. Being able to change user requirements for example, however all is not plain 
sailing within the Agile methodology. 
 
Looking at the values of agile we can see the four main values: 
 
A) Individuals and interactions over processes and tools 
B) Working software over comprehensive documentation 
C) Customer collaboration over contract negotiation 
D) Responding to change over following a plan 
 
Many agile puritans can take the above values literally and in the case of value number 2 can use 
this as an excuse not to document their work. Some developers see the documentation of their 
work as adding comments to the code to help explain certain functionality. In a study by Juyun 
Cho in 2008 were he interviewed nine developers in a company that produced small to medium 
web based projects, he found that several developers would comment their code but several did 
not.[13] This can lead to issues when new members join the team and are trying to understand 
what has been done in the past. This with the lack of a security framework can make developers 
write code that is unstable and insecure. 
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There is one gaping hole in the Agile methodology and that is lack of any security 
consideration.[14]The growing trend towards the use of agile techniques for building web 
applications means that it is essential that security engineering methods are integrated with agile 
processes.[15] Agile rapidly produces code on daily/weekly basis and that is what it is excellent 
at. However, we then revert back to the Waterfall methodology when it comes to performing an 
I.T.H.C. and technical accreditation activities.The Fail Fast, Fail Often is good when developing 
software, however this cannot be applied in a security context. This would result in data security 
breaches, loss of information and have massive reputational damage to the organisation who 
implemented it. 
 
As we can see the Agile methodology for developing software by creating smaller chunks of 
work rather that an “all or bust” mentality found in Waterfall has obvious advantages. The lack of 
security within Agile is not entirely true, as we do have pair programing giving more assurance 
than security.  As we have seen this can be costly to an organisation having to double up on staff 
and in times were public services are being cut and civil servants are losing their jobs does not 
bawd well. 
 
Performing pen testing activities within the sprint could prove to be extremely expensive when 
using third party testers. There is also the issue of getting pen testers on-site as there is usually a 
high demand for their skills within the market. Having pen testers assigned to projects to perform 
testing in the sprints for maybe 2 hours per day is also a waste of resource. Another solution is 
needed. 
 
2.6. Government Service Design Manual 
 
The following section briefly explores the Government Service Deign Manual, which is the 
standard that all new digital Government services are designed around. It is important to have a 
brief overview of this standard as this affects the accreditation process.[16] 
 
Software development goes through these phases: 
 
A) Discovery: This phase can be seen as a scoping phase where the project team is looking 
at user and business requirements, policies that can affect the service. If this is the 
transformation of an existing service into a digital service, then understanding the old 
service for example legacy interfaces and its underlying infrastructure is essential. 
 
B) Alpha: This is the phase were the Agile SDLC is started. The alpha release is the first 
release of the software or prototype the idea being that it will be used by stakeholders or 
end users to do the following[17]: 
 
a. Gain an insight into the service being developed. 
b. Testing the design concepts and the technology. 
c. Building a team. 
d. Gain an understanding who or what you’ll need for the Beta stage. 
 
C) Beta: The objective of the beta phase is to build a fully working prototype which you can 
test using your end users. Within the beta phase you are continuously tweaking the by 
rewriting code or replacing code to ensure the prototype is ready to go live. During beta 
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you will also ensure that any interfaces with other systems/application are operating 
correctly.  The Beta is also were the security accreditation work is started. 
D) Live:At this stage the application is ready for release it has undergone testing and been 
signed off by the business that they accept any risks. Also at this stage the project team 
would hand over to operational support including security operations who will monitor 
the application and be responsible for its day to day running and keeping it secure for 
example via patching. It is at this phase were you get the system accredited meaning the 
business has accepted any residual risks and has signed this off. 
 
E) Retirement: At this stage the system has served its life span and will be 
decommissioned. Users will be informed that the service is ending. URL’s will be 
redirected to the new service if applicable. 
 
From a security viewpoint, the following will apply but there could be others depending on the 
service: 
 
A) Data retention, how long do we need to keep the old data. 
B) Transferring the old data to a new provider in a secure manner. 
C) Data destruction, what is a suitable method to destroy the data. 
D) Decommission of old equipment in particular storage devices 
 
2.7. Issues with the Government Digital Service Manual 
 
The Government Digital Service Manual is a relatively new process and is being fine-tuned 
constantly. There is potential for improvement from a security perspective. 
 
Security is not officially engaged until the Beta phase of the service design process. Then we 
expect the security architect/consultant to get up to speed with the project. The security architect 
has then to understand the business requirements along with the application being designed and 
coded. The architect will start asking questions for example: 
 
A) What is the risk appetite of the organisation? 
B) Who are the threat actors? 
 
A security architect/consultant will not only be looking at technical security of the service but 
also the legal aspects of the service for example the U.K. Data Protection Act (DPA) and other 
European Union (EU) legislation. 
 
As stated above this is a new process and as the process evolves it is being improved with each 
iteration. 
 
2.8.HMG Security Standards and the Accreditation Process 
 
HMG is governed by a series of security standards and frameworks from a multitude of sources 
including the Cabinet Office (CO) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
Information Assurance (IA) branch, Communications Electronic Security Group (CESG). CESG 
provide IA assistance to Government via its internal staff, publications and until recently a body 
of approximately 600 private sector security consultants who make up the CESG Listed Advisor 
Scheme (CLAS). CLAS consultants typically advise Government organisations on behalf of 
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CESG on matters of IA and Security in general. The CLAS scheme is due to close between the 
end of 2015 and mid-2016. A new scheme called the Cyber Security Consultancy will replace it. 
Some examples of the many policies and frameworks that provide IA governance within HMG 
are: 
 
A) The Security Policy Framework (SPF 2014). 
B) CESG policies and guidelines for IA and risk management. 
C) Data Protection Act (DPA).  
D) Official Secrets Act (OSA). 
E) CPNI Advice. 
F) Council of the European Union (EU) Security Committee. 
Other non U.K. Government agencies that provide advise are: 
A) European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). 
B) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) based in North America 
 
Before discussing the accreditation process, it is important to discuss the accreditor. This is the 
person who will make decisions on behalf of the business risk owner, for example the risk owner 
could be a senior civil servant who is the sponsor for the project or the information asset owner. 
The accreditor must have a very good understanding of the business objectives; the value of the 
data the organisation is trying to protect. 
 
Below is definition of accreditation this is taken from the document produced by CESG titled 
“CESG IA Top Tips 2014/01 Accreditation”:  
 
“Accreditation is a decision - made by the business - to demonstrate confidence that the risks of 
engaging in an activity are balanced against the expected benefits of that activity.”[18] 
 
For example, a potential supplier of a web application whose users accessed via the Internet, the 
application had known security vulnerabilities that could not be mitigated. The accreditor 
normally would not recommend the application to be used in a live production service. In a 
different scenario, that very same application, does not connect to the Internet, and only one 
person can access the application from a closed network, that has no external links to other 
networks and is totally isolated. In this case, the accreditor may allow the system to be used as the 
risk of attack via an external attack vector is far less than that of the Internet connected 
application. 
 
Risk-based decisions should also take the financial costs to secure a system into consideration, if 
the costs to secure a system outweigh the costs that the system will generate then it is clearly not 
acceptable to spend the money securing the system an alternative should be sought.[19]The 
accreditation process is often lengthy and heavily dependent on documentation being produced at 
every stage and generally follows the Waterfall methodology. Accreditation is often engaged well 
after the system has been designed and is ready to go into production (live), this can produce 
extra costs to the business in having to redesign elements of the system to gain accreditation. It is 
often heavily dependent on the production of Risk Management and Accreditation 
Documentation Sets (RMADS). This is a document the accreditor will sign off to show he/she is 
happy with the risk approach that has been taken to the system. RMADS can be 150 plus pages’ 
long that are stored in a secure repository gathering dust and will generally only come out once a 
year for review and an I.T.H.C. (IT Health Check) being carried out. In between that time, we are 
reliant on a good patch management process keeping systems updated from known 
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vulnerabilities. In essence the RMADS are a snap shot of the system at a singular point in time, in 
today’s fast paced world a more dynamic process is needed to keep pace with technology and 
attack vector changes. 
 
Normally within the accreditation process a penetration test or I.T.H.C. is carried out on the post 
live application. For HMG this is normally carried out by a third party testing company who a 
CHECK accredited by CESG allowing them to penetration test HMG systems and 
applications.Once the I.T.H.C. has been carried out a report is generated on the vulnerabilities 
found within the application. This will form a basis for the production of a risk treatment plan 
(RPT), the RTP will list in order of severity the vulnerabilities found. The organisation will have 
a risk appetite; this is the amount of risk the organisation is prepared to tolerate before allowing a 
solution to go live. This is normally either set at High, Medium or Low. Once a vulnerability has 
been treated and mitigated the next vulnerability will be treated, this process goes on until all the 
risk at the risk appetite and above have been mitigated. Once this has happened and the risk 
management documentation has been complied and accepted will the system be allowed to go 
live. There are exceptions to this within some Government departments. The accreditor and the 
business can grant an Authority to Operate (ATO) allowing the system to be tested prior to the 
formal accreditation process to be completed. 
 
The accreditation process is heavily reliant on documentation, while the Agile approach supports 
the idea of only producing documentation when necessary and being ready to incorporate changes 
rapidly. Obviously, the two approaches do not bond very well. 
 
2.9. Issues with the Accreditation Process 
 
The accreditation process currently used with HMG is not suitable for a fast-paced methodology 
such as Agile. This is due to the accreditation process generally following a Waterfall 
methodology and not being easily adaptable to rapid changes.As we have seen, Agile is about 
creating software and getting it live as soon as possible. Within the Agile principles, there is no 
mention on how we create secure software; this is left to the individual organisation to try and 
resolve. 
 
The accreditation process differs between different projects. There is not a standard or a “one size 
fits all” approach. Each project has to be assessed within its own rights.What is needed is a new 
accreditation methodology that can work well with Agile but still satisfy the requirements of the 
business and accreditor to show that risks and in particular technical risks have been mitigated to 
an acceptable level for the business to be satisfied.  
 
It could be that we are now entering a new way of trying to ensure our systems and software are 
secure, by using assurance rather than a formal accreditation process. 
 
3. OWASP APPLICATION SECURITY VERIFICATION STANDARD 
 
One of the aims of the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) project is to 
enable a framework for performing Web application security verification using a commercially 
workable open standard that anybody can contribute to. The standard provides a basis for testing 
web application technical security controls, as well as any technical security controls in the 
environment, that are relied on, to protect against vulnerabilities such as Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) and SQL injection. This standard can be used to establish a level of confidence in the 
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security of web applications which can greatly assist the accreditor in his assessment of the risks 
associated with the application. 
 
ASVS can be used to produce an internal or external I.T.H.C. testing scope document. Third party 
and internal testers can test the application using the scope document ASVS produces. The 
standard will also provide guidance to application developers as to what security considerations 
to think about when developing the code for the application. This is also known as “security by 
design”. Incorporating “security by design” can save time and work having to retrofit and fix 
issues that are otherwise highlighted in the I.T.H.C. or pen test. It also gives an accreditor 
confidence that applications/systems are being developed with due diligence. ASVS can also 
assist in the writing of contracts or tender documents, to ensure suppliers are aware of what 
security controls are needed within the application they are developing. (OWASP, 2014) 
 
ASVS uses three levels for security controls, these are Levels 1, 2 and 3. The definition of these 
levels is as follows: 
 
A) L1 is intended for all software. 
B) L2 is for applications that process sensitive data that requires protection. 
C) L3 is for systems that handle sensitive personal data and or data that could have an impact 
on national security. 
 
The table below is shows the industry and threat profile it also gives examples of the three levels 
discussed above. This has the potential to be mapped to HMG security classifications:  
 
A) L1 (OFFICIAL) 
B) L2 (OFFICIAL/OFFICIAL SENSITIVE) 
C) L3 (SECRET/TOP SECRET) 
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Table 1. ASVS Levels. [20] 
 
Industry Threat Profile Recommendation L1  L2  L3  
Manufacturing, 
professional, 
transportation, 
technology, 
utilities, 
infrastructure, 
Government 
and defence. 
These industries may not 
appear to have very much in 
common, but the threat actors 
who are likely to attack 
organizations in this segment 
are more likely to perform 
focused attacks with more 
time, skill, and resources. 
Often the sensitive information 
or systems are not easy to 
locate and require leveraging 
insiders and social engineering 
techniques. Attacks may 
involve insiders, outsiders, or 
be collusion between the two. 
Their goals may include 
gaining access to intellectual 
property for strategic or 
technological advantage. We 
also do not want to overlook 
attackers looking to abuse 
application functionality 
influence the behavior of or 
disrupt sensitive systems. 
Most attackers are looking for 
sensitive data that can be used 
to directly or indirectly profit 
from to include personally 
identifiable information and 
payment data. Often the data 
can be used for identity theft, 
fraudulent payments, or a 
variety of fraud schemes. 
All network 
accessible 
applications. 
Applications 
containing 
internal 
information or 
information 
about 
employees that 
may be 
leveraged in 
social 
engineering. 
Applications 
containing 
nonessential, 
but important 
intellectual 
property or 
trade secrets. 
Applications 
containing 
valuable 
intellectual 
property, trade 
secrets, or 
government 
secrets (e.g. in 
the United States 
this may be 
anything 
classified at 
Secret or above) 
that is critical to 
the survival or 
success of the 
organization. 
Applications 
controlling 
sensitive 
functionality 
(e.g. transit, 
manufacturing 
equipment, 
control systems) 
or that have the 
possibility of 
threatening 
safety of life. 
 
 
The thought process behind the spreadsheet is for it to act as a framework providing guidance for 
security architects and developers when developing applications within an Agile sprint. The 
framework can also provide guidance for creating testing scope documents and for commercial 
departments to provide a baseline of security controls when outsourcing application development. 
 
3.1. How to Use the Framework Spreadsheet 
 
The screenshot below (Figure 2) shows the first worksheet that you will come to on opening the 
workbook. The “Cover” worksheet is the default, you must Enable Content that is displayed in 
the Security Warning to use the workbook. Here you can see the list of security controls 
embedded within the buttons. 
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Figure 1. Initial Screen. 
 
The first action is press the “Reset Data” button this will zero all entries on all worksheets ready 
for data input. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Security Control Screen. 
 
The next thing to do is select the security controls you require for your project. You can use “Y”, 
“y”, “YES”, “yes” or “Yes”. Note you need to select the section, this example “Architecture 
Design and Threat Modelling” has a Y in the “Required” cell.After you have selected the controls 
you need click the “Back to Cover Sheet” button and select the next security controls needed. Do 
this until all required controls have been selected.With the required security controls selected next 
select the “Create Test Scope” button this will then create the required test scope as in figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Test Scope. 
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Once the test scope is created you have the option to save the test scope worksheet into a separate 
workbook. You can use the “Save Test Scope As” button on the “Test Scope” worksheet or go 
back to the “Cover” worksheet to save. You can change the name of the file to be saved to your 
own choice. The test scope is created in the same directory as the framework spreadsheet.To 
create another test scope you will need to reset the data and start the process again. 
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There are three main common uses for the framework are: 
A) To assist security architects in writing I.T.H.C/Pen testing scope documents. 
B) To assist developers within Agile sprints. 
C) To assist Commercial departments in the tender process. 
 
What will be discussed below is a more detailed look into each of the three uses. 
 
4.1. Security by Design within Agile Sprints 
 
By incorporating the security framework within the Agile SDLC the security architect along with 
the software developers can help bridge the gap that exists within Agile Scrum in the fact that 
there are no security considerations.The framework could be discussed within the sprint backlog 
meeting with the security architect present. In a joint effort the security architect and developers 
can go through the framework and match the controls to the sprint. This has the added benefit that 
the security architect is now a sprint team member and included within the team. What has 
happened in the past is that the security architect is often seen as a non-team member and 
communication between the developers and the architect is non-existent. This also fits with the 
following Agile values and principles. 
 
Values: 
 
A) Individuals and interactions over processes and tools. 
 
Principles: 
 
A) Business people and developers must work together daily throughout the project. 
B) The most efficient and effective method of conveying information to and within a 
development team is face-to-face conversation. 
C) Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances agility. 
 
In addition to using the framework within the Agile sprints, automated source code checking 
could be used. This would give some form of assurance to the business that the application has no 
glaring security holes in it. It would also aid in situations where the infrastructure has not been 
built to test the code on.A copy of the test scope should also be placed next to the Agile task 
board acting as a daily reminder of the security controls for the sprint. 
 
4.2.I.T.H.C/Pen Testing Development 
 
The framework in this instance could be used to help the security architects in developing an 
internal testing scope or a testing scope for third party testers.Security architects and consultants 
need to have an understanding of the ongoing work, and be able to perform penetration testing to 
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a suitable standard. The framework should be used as the scope for such testing. Having a 
security architect available to security test code would enable the smooth integration of security 
within the Agile sprint. 
 
The application will still have to be formally penetration tested by a CHECK test team prior to 
going live (only in Central Government) but by testing internally we can be assured that no huge 
security vulnerabilities exist. This will reduce the risk that the final testing will find any 
vulnerabilities that could prevent the application from go live. 
 
4.3.Commercial Tender Process 
 
When outsourcing the development of systems to third parties the framework can be used as a 
baseline of security controls that must be followed by the supplier’s developers. Suppliers can 
add addition security controls but must adhere to the framework as a reference baseline.  
 
4.4.Government Service Design Manual 
 
In the Government Service Design Manual security and accreditation are not engaged until the 
Beta phase of the process, what would be better is rather than having one work stream have two. 
The first work stream will follow the process as advised in the manual. The second work stream 
would be the security work stream. This would run in parallel when the discovery phase begins. 
This would enable security to have a greater understanding of the business requirements and 
current issues. It would also enable security to start on the risk and threat modelling activities, 
these would be fine-tuned and updated until the Beta phase begins. 
 
4.5.General Recommendations 
 
The framework could be used as a reference when organisations are developing applications 
using non Agile methodologies, for example the framework could be used as a reference artefact 
for use within The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF). 
 
Security architects and security consultants often come from a networking or infrastructure 
background, with smaller software development experience. It would be impossible for a security 
architect to be proficient in every software development language for the purpose of security 
checking code. What could be achieved is providing basic security training or briefings to 
developers to give them an understanding of what security concerns they should be addressing 
within the sprint. The developers are at the coal face and working with code on a daily basis, 
whereas a security architect or consultant may not be.In addition to using the framework within 
the Agile sprints, automated source code checking could be used. This would give some form of 
assurance to the business that the application has no glaring security holes in it. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This work takes an initial step into the integration of a security framework into Agile scrum used 
within HMG. For Agile and the security accreditation processes to work together there has to be a 
compromise between the two. For a long time, security has been seen as a blocker or at least a 
massive speed bump that slows down a project, in some cases bringing the project to a complete 
halt.  
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Project managers and the business will often try to circumvent the speed bump, often by 
deliberately not informing the security team about decisions made within the project. This can, 
and often does, have the undesired effect of weakening the security and allowing vulnerabilities 
to be missed.For systems at the OFFICIAL classification, the “old style” way we think about 
security within HMG has to change. There still has to be a formal process of providing evidence 
to the business that a system or application is as secure as it can be. However, this process is 
moving more to an assurance rather than full blown accreditation process. 
 
The business needs to engage with security at the very beginning of the discovery phase and not 
at the very end of the development process as often this is too late for security to have any impact. 
Security has to be seen as a business enabler and be embedded into the overhaul process, not 
something that we think about at the last minute. 
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